Security architecture
The trust gap in rented compute
When a workload runs on someone else's hardware, the operator can normally read its memory. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) close that hole in silicon, producing attestations: hardware-signed evidence of exactly what code, in exactly what configuration, is running inside the enclave.
But an attestation is only useful if the counterparty can verify it and act on it. That is the part VirtEngine puts on-chain.
Security architecture
Attestation as chain state
The enclave module (x/enclave) records and verifies TEE attestations against the state machine's expectations. A provider's confidential-compute capability becomes a verifiable on-chain claim — and a filterable attribute. Tenants can constrain orders to attested enclave execution, so unverified capacity never even matches.
Security architecture
Secrets released only after proof
The encryption module (x/encryption) implements envelope encryption to specific recipients. In confidential workflows, workload secrets — keys, model weights, sensitive configuration — are sealed so they can only be delivered into an enclave whose attestation has verified. The sequence is proof first, secrets second, and it is enforced by protocol machinery rather than provider goodwill.
Security architecture
The rest of the assurance stack
Confidential workloads inherit the marketplace's full trust apparatus: VEID-verified counterparties, chain-anchored mTLS (x/cert) on every off-chain connection, auditor-signed provider attributes (x/audit), and fraud enforcement with dispute intake if conduct fails. For enterprises, this is the difference between a confidentiality feature and a confidentiality argument that survives procurement review.
Security architecture
Where to apply it
The pattern fits wherever data or models must not be exposed to the infrastructure operator: regulated datasets, proprietary model weights during training or inference, key-handling services, and multi-party computations where participants trust the enclave but not each other.